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Abstract 
We examine the timing of firms’ operations in a formal model of labor demand.  Merging a 
variety of data sets from Portugal from 1995-2004, we describe temporal patterns of firms’ 
demand for labor and estimate production-functions and relative labor-demand equations. The 
results demonstrate the existence of substitution of employment across times of the day/week 
and show that legislated penalties for work at irregular hours induce firms to alter their 
operating schedules.  The results suggest a role for such penalties in an unregulated labor 
market, such as the United States, in which unusually large fractions of work are performed at 
night and on weekends. 
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I. Introduction 
The effect of labor costs on the number of workers that firms seek to employ and the 
intensity with which those workers are employed is one of the most-studied subjects in labor 
economics.  The theory has proceeded from the theory of production to examining profit-
maximizing behavior in the face of per-hour and per-worker costs that are assumed to be 
exogenous to the firm.  Implicit in the entire literature are “t” subscripts—labor-demand 
functions and production functions are defined over particular intervals of time during which 
the factor inputs are assumed to be productive.  While every economist knows that, with 
almost no exceptions (but see Stafford, 1980, and more broadly Winston, 1982) the 
theoretical discussion has treated time units as if they are all the same—one hour, or one week 
of labor inputs is the same regardless of the time of day or week of the year when it occurs.  
Hours of the day are not the same to workers.  In a relatively unregulated labor 
market like that in the United States, we observe, as one would expect from the hedonic 
model (Rosen, 1974), that those individuals performing work at unusual times (nights and 
weekends) tend to have relatively little human capital, and are workers for whom the 
attraction of a market-generated compensating wage differential makes work at these times 
relatively attractive (Hamermesh, 1999b).  We may infer from the wage premium and the 
characteristics of workers observed on the job at different times that the timing of work 
matters to workers.  Indeed, many countries impose wage penalties in the form of mandatory 
premium pay on worker-hours that are utilized outside of what are deemed to be standard 
hours.  These are quite different from the overtime penalties that many countries also assess 
on total hours (usual weekly) that an employee works beyond a standard amount. Our focus 
here is thus on the timing of labor inputs, not their quantity.  
Absent differences in input prices arising from workers’ preferences and/or 
government mandates, employers’ labor demand will vary hebdomadally.  Some firms face 
greater product demand, and a greater derived labor demand, on weekends (e.g., golf clubs), 
while others may find their customers offering higher prices late on weekday evenings (e.g., 
take-out restaurants serving Wall Street law firms).  For this reason any study of the demand 
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for labor in time must account as carefully as the data allow for inter-firm differences in 
work-timing resulting from heterogeneity in the temporal pattern of product demand.  
The most likely reason why there have, to our knowledge, been literally no formal 
analyses of the general question and of labor-market policies affecting high-frequency 
temporal differences in work-timing has been the complete absence of data that would allow 
examining these issues.  Fortunately a variety of firm-level surveys conducted in Portugal can 
be combined to study the issue, with the crucial data set being one that shows the number of 
workers on the job at each hour of the week.   
In what follows we therefore first outline the nature of legislative mandates on work-
timing in a number of countries and in Portugal.  We then describe the Portuguese data, 
discuss how we select the samples to use in the estimation and describe some broad patterns 
of time use across the week.  In Section IV we discuss the models that we estimate—
production tableaux and relative labor-demand equations—and describe how they can be used 
to generate estimates of the relevant parameters. Section V presents the estimates of these 
structural equations; as an interesting by-product it also examines how the impacts of various 
demographic differences on a firm’s sales compare to estimates of their effects on wages. 
Section VI presents a few policy simulations using these estimates.  
II. The Regulation of Work Timing 
Work outside daytime weekday hours, especially night work, has long attracted 
regulatory attention. The International Labor Organization (ILO) alone has devoted eight 
conventions to night work, especially that performed by women and younger workers. The 
regulation of night work is typically justified on the grounds of concerns with workers’ 
health, although their ability to meet family and social responsibilities is also a concern. 
Accordingly, most rules addressing the issue are targeted at night workers’ health conditions 
and at the specification of workers’ rights to being transferred to a similar daytime job if they 
are, for reasons of health, seen as unfit for night work. Existing rules also often call for 
compensation for night work, either in the form of a compensatory rest period or additional 
pay. ILO Convention No. 171, for example, calls for various benefits that recognize the 
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“nature of night work.” Many European nations and Japan (as well as many less developed 
countries) have followed this and similar recommendations and passed legislation that sets 
specific rules about the compensation of night workers.  
Table 1 describes rules on night and weekend work in a number of developed 
countries and makes the point that wage penalties mandated on employers of night workers 
are of interest to many nations. In many more countries than Table 1 suggests, especially in 
Europe, night work is addressed by collective agreements rather than legislatively. For 
example, a survey of collective bargaining covering Spanish firms shows that 49 percent of 
collective agreements establish a specific pay rate for night work that is on average 23 percent 
above the pay rate for similar daytime work.1 
Portuguese legislation, while allowing employers to organize working time as they 
see fit, sets a number of rules that may condition the timing of economic activity and whose 
impact is the focus of this study.2  The duration of work is set by collective agreement, but the 
law stipulates the maximum length of both the workday (8 hours) and the workweek (40 
hours), with these limits extendable up to 10 hours per day and 50 hours per week. Overtime 
work is permitted in cases of an exceptional workload or if there is the risk of an imminent 
economic loss by the firm, but even then it is limited to a maximum of 200 hours per year.3 
An overtime pay premium is due, varying from 50 to 100 percent of the straight-time wage 
rate depending on the number of consecutive overtime hours. 
All night work (defined in 2003 as work performed between 8PM and 7AM) carries a 
wage penalty of 25 percent (DL 409/71, art. 30). A number of health and safety regulations, 
including mandatory regular medical check-ups especially designed for night workers, are 
also in place. Regular night work may or may not be integrated into a shift-work system. That 
                                                 
1Conducted by the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (Eironline, 2003).  
 
2The regulatory framework described in this section was in effect at the time the data used in the 
empirical part were collected (May 2003). In December 2003, the Portuguese Labor Law was heavily 
modified.  Very unfortunately, no survey on the timing of work in firms has been conducted since the 
legislative changes occurred. 
 
3By contrast, in 2007 in the U.S. the average worker in manufacturing worked 4.2 hours of overtime in 
a typical week (Economic Report of the President, 2008), which could not, given the annual maximum, 
have occurred in Portugal for any worker. 
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is likely to be the usual case, as the law also establishes that a shift system has to be organized 
whenever the length of the operating period exceeds the normal period of work. Work on 
weekends is also subject to a number of rules, as Saturday and Sunday are the default 
mandatory weekly rest days. The corresponding wage penalty is not set by law, but collective 
bargaining can and usually does stipulate one.4 
It makes sense to consider four different pay regimes, each corresponding to work 
done at different times: Regular hours, 7AM-8PM Monday-Friday, with no wage penalty; 
night weekday hours, 8PM–7AM Monday-Friday, penalized 25 percent; daytime hours on 
weekends, 7AM-8PM Saturday and Sunday, penalized varying from 0 to 100 percent; and 
night weekend hours, 8PM-7AM Saturday and Sunday, penalized varying from 25 to 150 
percent.5  
III. Data, Concepts and Descriptive Statistics 
A.  Creating the Data Set 
The data used in this study come from three sources: Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth 
QP) (Personnel Records)6; an Annex to the Portuguese contribution to the European Union 
Company Survey of Operating Hours and Working Times and Employment (EUCOWE); and 
the Employment Survey (ES).  
The QP is an administrative matched employer-employee data set collected by the 
Portuguese Ministry of Employment. Reporting is mandatory for all employers with at least 
one wage-earner, excluding public administration and domestic work. It is thus basically a 
census of the private sector. The data refer to one reference week in October and include the 
worker’s wage (split into several components), age, gender, schooling, occupation, tenure, 
                                                 
4Although this is by no means a general rule, since weekend hours are by no means necessarily 
overtime hours, the overtime pay premium for weekend work (100 percent) puts a de facto cap on what 
collective bargaining rules will stipulate. The absence of a unique well-defined penalty for work at any 
given time is analogous to the frequent absence of a well-defined overtime penalty noted for the U.K. 
by Hart and Ruffell (1993). 
 
5The exact starting and ending hours of night work may be set differently by collective agreement. The 
law stipulates that work done over an 11-hour interval that contains 7 consecutive hours within the 
10PM–7AM interval may be considered night work if that is so agreed (art. 29-2). 
 
6Some recent examples of uses of data from the QP are Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Varejão and 
Portugal (2007).   
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skill level, normal hours of work, overtime hours of work, the industry and location of both 
the firm and the establishment, and firm sales. 
The Portuguese contribution to the EUCOWE survey was also carried out in June 
2003 by the Ministry of Employment, with questions referring to the week of May 5-11, 
2003, during which there were no public holidays.7 It was addressed to establishments in all 
industries (except agriculture and public administration) and all size classes. Besides 
extensive information on the length and organization of working hours and hours of 
operation, Portuguese respondents were asked to report the number of employees working at 
the establishment during each hour of the survey week. Only outside contractors, temporary 
agency workers and unpaid workers were excluded from this head-count. The questionnaire 
was administered to a sample that was stratified by size-class and industry and drawn from 
the universe of firms responding to the QP.8 The initial sample included 6,002 establishments, 
3,127 of which returned responses. Only 2,818 plants provided data that were internally 
consistent and validated by the Ministry of Employment.  
The Employment Survey is a quarterly household survey standardized across 
European countries. It collects detailed information on individuals’ demographic 
characteristics and labor-market status. From this sample we use individuals’ self-reports on 
the broad outlines of their work schedules (daytime weekday, night, Saturday and Sunday 
work), gender, age, education, occupation, industry and location. The original sample 
contained 50,714 observations. After restricting the sample to those in employment (and with 
valid information on the variables selected), we obtained a sample of 19,448 individuals.  
                                                 
7The survey was conducted in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom as part of an EU-funded project on operating hours, working time and employment. A 
summary of the findings can be found in Delsen et al (2007).  Although the same basic questionnaire 
was used in all countries, the annex we use was specific to Portugal.  Because no other country that 
fielded the EUCOWE obtained information on the number of workers present at each hour of the week, 
currently the questions we ask can only be answered using Portuguese data. 
 
8Four size classes and seven industry groups were considered for stratification of the sample. The four 
size strata are: 1-19, 20-249, 250-499 and 500 or more employees. The seven industry strata are: 
Primary sector, secondary sector, construction, distributive services, producer services, social services, 
and personal services. 
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Given our focus on productivity, it is crucial that our proxy for production (total 
sales) be measured at the same level as employment. Sales in the QP are, however, recorded 
only at the firm level. For that reason we restrict the data set to single-establishment firms 
(approximately 70 percent of the sample, 1,949 firms).  Since annual sales for 2003 are 
reported in the 2004 wave of the QP, we use both the 2003 (for workforce characteristics) and 
the 2004 (for sales) waves of this data source. The requirement that the firm be present in both 
waves eliminated another 371 establishments, generating a sample of 1,578 establishments. 
We have furthermore dropped one-worker firms (60) and those that, although they responded, 
did not complete the table on the timing of work (554), resulting in a final sample of 964 
firms.9 
While the EUCOWE reports total employment at each time of the day, it does not 
contain any information on the composition of employment by skill level.  Since the skill 
composition of the workforce at different hours will have an impact on the productivity of 
labor, we impute the time-specific composition of the workforce.  Starting with the 
information in the Employment Survey, we estimate the probability that an employee works at 
night, Saturday or Sunday (which we will refer to as time t).10 We used all the worker 
attributes X that are common to the variables in the QP and the ES (gender, age, education, 
occupation, industry and location), to estimate the determinants of pt, the probability of work 
at time t. 
We then apply the estimated coefficients from these probits to the vector X of worker 
attributes in the QP to obtain for each worker a prediction of the probability that s/he engages 
in daytime weekday, night, Saturday or Sunday work. Taking 0.5 as the cut-off, we imputed 
                                                 
9There are nearly 200,000 single-plant firms in the QP, making this sample potentially highly selected 
out of the population.  A probit relating inclusion in our final data set to all the control variables used in 
the analysis suggests that, other than unexplained differences by industry, only firm size (sales) has an 
important impact, with doubling a firm’s size increasing its chance of inclusion in our sample from 
0.005 to 0.01.  Given that the original EUCOWE sample was representative of the population, these 
probits suggest that non-response to the EUCOWE and our further restrictions have not altered the 
representativeness of the data set along most dimensions. 
  
10We would have liked to go one step further and estimate the probability of work for the same time 
division as in the company survey.  However, the Employment Survey only reports whether employees 
worked at different periods of the day and the week, not the specific hours when work took place. 
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for each individual worker in the QP employed by the firms answering the time-use survey 
his/her status as a night worker, Saturday worker and Sunday worker.  It is possible that a 
worker in the QP could be classified in any from one to four of the work-timing categories. 
B. Basic Facts about the Timing of Work 
Here we provide a detailed representation of the process of putting labor to work over 
the course of one workweek. Dividing the workweek into 168 one-hour intervals, Figure 1 is 
a firm-based tempogram that represents the total number of workers present at work at each 
hour of the survey week.11  The figure describes the rhythmic nature of the demand for labor 
services within a single week. It shows that the number of individuals working at nights is 
only a small fraction of the total present at work in daytime and that the same pattern is 
repeated from Monday to Friday. It also shows that daytime workers do not all arrive at work 
at the same time, but rather that they spread their starting hours from 7AM to 10AM, at which 
time the majority of all daytime workers are simultaneously present at the workplace. The 
same is true for the transition between daytime and nighttime, as workers start to leave at 
around 5PM, although the minimum level of employment is not reached before 10-11PM. 
Another distinctive characteristic of intra-day employment variation is the abrupt 
reduction in the number of individuals working between Noon and 2PM, no doubt due to 
lunch breaks.  The number working on weekends is also very small compared to the 
corresponding count on weekdays. The difference, however, is much more pronounced when 
we compare daytime hours than when we examine night hours. From Saturday to Sunday 
there is a slight reduction in the number of people working, independent of the hour of the day 
that we consider. Also on weekends, but especially on Sundays, there is a much smaller drop-
off in the number of employees at work at lunchtime. 
Because there are both technical and economic reasons behind the choice of the 
timing of the economic activity, it is worth looking at how changes in the number of workers 
at work over the week vary from industry to industry, as different industries face quite diverse 
technical and demand constraints. Very different patterns emerge across industries, as shown 
                                                 
11While the term tempogram, and figures for typical workdays, have been used in recent studies based 
on household time-diary surveys (e.g., Michelson and Crouse, 2004), unsurprisingly given the novelty 
of our data set none has been generated for establishments.  
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in Figure 2. Two sectors—construction, and finance and services to firms—stand out by their 
absence of weekend operations. To some extent this is also true for mining industries, except 
for a small amount of daytime Saturday work. The public utilities sector—typically associated 
with continuous operations—exhibits a very repetitive pattern over the week, high and above 
a constant baseline that corresponds to the level of employment necessary to guarantee 
emergency services/continuous production. This is also the case in the transportation and 
communications sector, although there the level of employment on weekends is significantly 
higher than during weekday nights. Manufacturing is the only sector (followed at a distance 
by personal services sector) to maintain a relatively high level of night work. 
Some of the characteristics depicted in Figures 1 and 2 may appear unusual, 
especially to readers unfamiliar with the Portuguese economy.  Of particular note is the 
relatively sharp drop-off in employees at work over the weekday lunch-hour and, as compared 
to the U.S., the relatively low intensity of work at night.  As a check on this pattern Figure 3 
reproduces a tempogram from the 1999 Portuguese Time Use Survey (INE 2001), which was 
based on diaries completed by individuals.  This tempogram makes it clear that, if anything, 
our firm-based data give lower estimates of the decline in work intensity over weekday lunch 
hours than do household data, and they clearly do not overstate the rarity of night work 
relative to those data.12 
The data presented in Figures 1 and 2 are the best descriptions of the burden of work 
at different times on the work force. They may not, however, describe firms’ patterns of 
operation if there are differences in opening hours by size of firm, or if, conditional on being 
in operation, there are consistent differences in worker utilization rates at different times.  To 
examine patterns of operation, in Figure 4 we present a tempogram showing the number of 
firms in our sample (out of 964) that are open at each hour of the week.  Comparing the 
pattern to that in Figure 1, one sees that it appears to be somewhat thicker at irregular hours, 
                                                 
12Whether the firm-based or individual-based tempogram is more accurate is not clear. Part of the 
differences may be due to different coverage of workers by sector.  Regardless, it has become standard 
in the literature on measurement error in labor-related data to assume that the employer-provided 
information is correct (e.g., Bound et al, 1994).  
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suggesting that firms that operate at those times are either smaller than average and/or use 
fewer employees than they do at other times. 
C. The Composition of the Workforce by the Timing of Work 
Based on our procedure to infer the composition of work at night, Saturday and 
Sunday, we find that 7.5 percent of workers perform some night work, 18.6 percent some 
Saturday work and 5.1 percent some Sunday work.  Table 2 traces the profile of this 
workforce and compares it to the total workforce in the surveyed firms.13  Men are dominant 
in all three irregular periods of work, and women are especially rare among night workers. 
Night workers are also younger and more skilled than weekend workers. The same is true for 
Saturday workers compared to Sunday workers. In general working at these irregular hours 
disproportionately involves men, individuals with intermediate levels of education and skilled 
workers. This seems different from what has been observed for the U. S. (Hamermesh, 1999a) 
and may be the result of the high penalties imposed on hours employed at irregular times in 
Portugal.  
The legal setting considers blocks of work times (night versus day, weekday versus 
weekend) as homogeneous units, subject to the same wage compensation scheme. That is one 
factor suggesting lumping specific times of the week into groups of working hours. Also, 
fitting the legal setting, the Employment Survey only asks individuals whether they work at 
nights, Saturdays or Sundays and not at which specific hour of the week, so that we can only 
get information on workers’ characteristics for large blocks of work times. Moreover, if we 
were to consider each single hour of the week, a majority of firms would show no workers for 
many of them, which poses problems for estimation.  For these reasons we aggregate the 
timing of work into two blocks, distinguishing between times of the week with no pay penalty 
and those subject to a penalty, i.e. daytime weekday hours (regular hours) and night or 
weekend work (irregular hours). 
                                                 
13Even though the firm time-use survey gives us the number of workers at every time of day-week, we 
cannot from there trace the identity or characteristics of individual workers across each hour of the 
week. Indeed, knowing that the firm has, for example, 20 workers from midnight to 4AM is compatible 
with having just 20 workers at  that time, or having 80 workers, each working one single hour (or any 
situation in-between). The firm-based survey does not identify individual workers. 
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IV. Production and Demand Models 
The simplest model that we estimate imposes a Cobb-Douglas technology and divides 
time into D (65 hours per week), 7AM–8PM, Monday through Friday, and the rest N (103 
hours per week).  Implicitly we assume for simplicity’s sake that all irregular work time is 
linearly aggregable.  The Cobb-Douglas specification assumes the usual unitary elasticity of 
substitution between worker-hours employed at these two times of the day/week.  In order to 
obtain better estimates of the demand elasticities on which any policy that might affect the 
timing of work should be based, we thus also relax the Cobb-Douglas assumption and 
estimate the following translog approximation to a general function: 
(1) ln(Yk) = a0 + aDln(Dk) + aNln(Nk) + .5{aDD[ln(Dk)]2 + aNN[ln(Nk)]2 +                      
aDNln(Dk)· ln(Nk)} + ξk , 
where k denotes the firm, D is 1 plus the number of worker-hours employed during normal 
hours, and N is 1 plus the number employed during irregular hours. Testing the overall 
significance of the vector aij, i, j = D, N, allows us to test the validity of imposing the Cobb-
Douglas technology. With the translog approximation, and assuming constant returns to scale, 
the parameter estimates can be readily transformed (Hamermesh, 1993) and combined with 
estimates of the shares of D and N in total labor costs to obtain estimates of elasticities of 
demand for labor at the two times. 
 One might ask whether the application of production theory makes sense in this 
context.  While we can and do obtain measures of substitution between daytime weekday and 
irregular hours, the theoretical basis of production functions lies in the idea of cooperating 
factors.  Since weekday and other hours are by definition not used simultaneously, the notion 
of cooperation here cannot be the usual one. 
 An alternative approach avoids assuming cooperation by labor-hours used at different 
times and assumes instead that the firm chooses how much to produce during daytime 
weekday hours and how much during others.14  It faces an exogenous hourly wage w for 
daytime weekday hours, and a wage of [1+θ]w for other hours, where θ is the legislated or 
                                                 
14In a sense this approach is like the less formal examination of shift work by Bresnahan and Ramey 
(1994) and Mayshar and Halevy (1997) . 
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bargained penalty rate.  In addition to wage costs the firm has fixed costs V of employing a 
worker.  If we assume that workers employed at daytime weekday and irregular hours work 
the same total hours per week, then we can denote the per-hour fixed costs of employment as 
v per worker for both types of workers.  Thus the cost of an hour of daytime weekday labor is 
w + v, while each irregular hour costs [1+θ]w + v. 
 The relative price of irregular compared to normal hours can thus be written: 
  R = [1 + φ + θ]/[1 + φ] , 
where φ = v/w .  Then ∂R/∂θ = 1/[1 + φ], so that an increase in the penalty rate θ raises the 
relative price of an hour of labor at N relative to D in inverse relationship to the ratio of fixed 
costs to the hourly wage rate.  We cannot observe any cross-section variation in θ in the 
sample, but the theory of factor demand predicts that, where fixed costs of employment are 
relatively more important for workers with the same hourly wage, we will observe relatively 
more work occurring at irregular hours. We can therefore write: 
(2) {ln(N) - ln(D)}k =  γ0 + γ1φk + γ2Xk + ψk , 
the relative demand equation for worker-hours at the two mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
time periods of the workweek, with a vector X of control variables, parameters γ and 
disturbance ψ.   
A long literature (beginning with Rosen, 1968, and Ehrenberg, 1971) has argued 
theoretically and demonstrated empirically that, where the fixed costs of employment are 
higher relative to hourly wages, overtime hours will be used more intensively.  We can thus 
write: 
[OH/H]k = f(φk), f’ > 0  , 
 
where OH are overtime and H total hours.  Linearizing, taking the inverse function and 
adding an error term, we obtain: 
(3) φk = α0 + α1[OH/H]k + υk . 
Substituting (3) back into (2) we derive the estimating equation: 
(4) {ln(N) - ln(D)}k =  β0 + β1[OH/H]k + β2Xk + µk , β1>0. 
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 In Portugal, as in many other southern European countries, concerns about labor-
market rigidity led to increased permission for firms to employ workers on fixed-term 
contracts. These contracts presumably lower the fixed costs of employment, particularly firing 
costs. Another proxy for φ-1 is thus λ, the fraction of workers on fixed-term contract, which as 
a proxy will lead to a relative reduction in the use of work at irregular hours.  Adding this 
term to (4) we thus obtain an alternative estimating equation: 
 (5) {ln(N) - ln(D)}k =  δ0 + δ1[OH/H]k + δ3λk + δ2Xk + ωk , δ1>0, δ3<0. 
V. Estimates of the Cobb-Douglas, Translog and Relative-Demand Models 
We estimate all models for all the single-plant firms on which we have data, and then 
separately for two groups of industries: Manufacturing, mining, and utilities; and services, 
trade, and transportation. In every case, the regressions include two-digit industry fixed 
effects to account for some of the unmeasurable differences in production technologies across 
firms. Also included in all the estimates are variables designed to account for differences in 
the efficiency units of labor of various types.  Thus we include indicators accounting for three 
age groups (under 35, 35-49 and 50 plus), four levels of education (<9, 9-11, 12, and >12 
years), and gender. 
 Table 3 presents the estimates of these expanded production functions.  The first thing 
to note is that there is some evidence of increasing returns to labor (not long-run, as we do not 
include measures of capital stock, not having such data).  This might be viewed as evidence 
for the familiar short-run increasing returns to labor (noted by, among others, Morrison and 
Berndt, 1981) observed in the estimation of standard production frameworks.  Even with the 
measures of workers’ characteristics with which we expand the basic production model there 
are significant differences across detailed industries:  In all the estimates we reject the 
hypothesis that the two-digit industry fixed effects are jointly zero.  Finally, it is also worth 
noting that tests of the Cobb-Douglas restrictions are soundly rejected:  In the overall sample 
and the two sub-samples the three higher-order terms are jointly statistically significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels.   
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 The parameter estimates on the control variables all make economic sense (even 
though not all are individually statistically significant).  Thus productivity appears to be 
related to age, although the inverse-U shaped pattern with experience appears quite flat. 
Examining the role of formal investment in human capital, the education effects are 
substantial, so that productivity would be 23 percent higher in a firm with all workers who 
had completed grade 9 compared to one composed entirely of workers who had not gone 
beyond grade 8. The effects of having completed secondary education on productivity are 
huge, which is usual in studies of the Portuguese labor market (OECD, 2006), and the impact 
of having attended university is even more immense.15  (This is not surprising, given that in 
Portugal at this time half of the labor force had not attended high school at all.)  Finally, for 
whatever reason productivity falls as the share of women in a firm rises from zero to one.   
 A few studies for the United States have used matched worker-firm data to compare 
estimates of the sizes of effects of demographic characteristics on sales (in a production-
function framework) to estimates of their effects on earnings (e.g., Hellerstein et al, 1999, 
Haltiwanger et al, 2007).  To replicate this exercise for a less developed economy, we digress 
and present estimates of log-earnings equations based on individual workers in the same firms 
included in the estimation of the production functions in Table 3. 
The second column of Table 4 shows estimates of plant-level wage equations. The 
dependent variable is the total gross monthly wage bill, and the independent variables are the 
same used in the re-estimation of the Cobb-Douglas function that we present in the first 
column of Table 4.  These estimates render the coefficients in the earnings equation directly 
comparable to the estimates of the production function.16  Both equations also include two-
digit industry fixed effects. 
                                                 
15The share of employees who have completed each level of education is clearly endogenous at the 
firm level, with it possibly being the case that inherently more successful entrepreneurs attract 
unobservably more productive workers. This potential difficulty pervades this little literature, and we 
see no obvious solution with the data that we have available.  
  
16The total gross monthly wage bill includes all regularly paid components of remuneration. To 
facilitate the formal test on equality of coefficients across equations, we have estimated a seemingly 
unrelated regression model, with the (log) wage bill and the (log) sales as dependent variables. Because 
the wage data were not available for 10 plants used in estimating the production functions, to maintain 
exact comparability the SUR model excludes those firms. 
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As one might expect, unobservable intra-industry differences that have a positive 
impact on the sales of the firm also have a positive impact on its wage bill, with the 
correlation between the residuals of the two equations being 0.58.  Interesting results emerge 
as we test the equality of coefficients across the equations in the first two columns of Table 4. 
Starting with the gender coefficients, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a change in the 
share of female employees leads to a similar variation in the firm’s production as in its wage 
bill. Quantitatively, if the share of females in a firm increases by 10 percentage points, the 
firm’s production would decrease by 2.6 percent, and its wage bill would decrease by 2.2 
percent. A similar result holds when we compare the coefficients on most variables (for 
example, the shares of workers in different age groups, and the share of workers with 9 years 
of schooling).  
The notable exceptions to the similarity of wage and productivity effects occur for 
workers with a high school or university degree. Their remarkable contribution to the 
production of the firm is not matched by the returns to their extra schooling. If the share of 
workers in the firm with a university degree increased by 10 percentage points, the firm’s 
wage bill would increase by 11.2 percent, but its production would rise by 18.6 percent.  For 
workers with a high-school diploma the results are equally striking: A 10 percentage-point 
increase in the share of these workers in the firm’s workforce is associated with a 4.3 percent 
increase in the wage bill but a 10.8 percent increase in production. 
For comparison purposes the final column of Table 4 presents estimates of the wage 
equation estimated over the 60,000 individuals employed by the firms in our sample, as 
reported in the QP.  The estimated impacts of being female, and of various education levels, 
are quite similar to those generated by the establishment-level equations.  That is not true for 
the estimates of the impact of age:  The individual-based estimates are quite consistent with 
the large human-capital literature, while the establishment-based estimates are not.  This 
could arise if, as seems likely (Haltiwanger et al, 1999), the share of employees aged 50 or 
above is positively correlated with the age of the firm relative to others in its industry, and 
older firms are inherently less productive than others within an industry.   Finally, the 
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variables ln(D) and ln(N) in this equation essentially measure firm size; as such, the estimated 
impacts on workers’ wages mirror those found in the literature (Idson and Oi, 1999). 
As noted above, the translog tableau describes the data better than the restrictive 
Cobb-Douglas form, so we concentrate on it in discussing the structural parameters.  They can 
be transformed into elasticities of complementarity and, as noted, with the assumption of 
constant returns to scale they are transformable into elasticities of substitution.17  Multiplying 
by the shares of earnings at the two sets of times, we then obtain the elasticities of factor 
price, εij, and the price elasticities of demand, ηij, shown in Table 5.18  The first thing to note 
about them is that these calculations, which combine the parameter estimates with the factor 
shares, yield estimated structural parameters that do have the expected signs:  The own-price 
demand elasticities are negative, and the cross-price elasticities are positive, none of which 
was imposed on the estimation.19 
Concentrating on the cross-price demand elasticities, since they are more familiar 
than the factor-price elasticities, we see that the estimates for the entire sample and for the 
larger sub-sample of manufacturing, etc., suggest reasonable responses to changes in the 
relative price of operating at different times of the day/week.  The estimates for services, etc., 
are astronomically high, a result of the near-zero estimated elasticities of factor-price that 
were generated from the translog parameters that we estimated for that sub-sample.  In the 
end, one might interpret our results as showing in a formal model that there does appear to be 
substitution between using labor during daytime weekday and irregular work times; but 
possibly because of the apparent short-run increasing returns to scale, possibly because the 
                                                 
17The own-quantity elasticity of complementarity is [aii +  s2i  - si]/ s2i ; the cross-quantity elasticity is 1 
+ aij/sisj., where s is the share of the input in total labor cost. 
 
18To obtain the share of earnings at times D we multiply weekday night hours by 1.25, daytime 
weekend hours by 2, and weekend night hours by 2.5, and compare the result to its sum with daytime 
weekday hours. 
 
19One might be concerned that many (nearly 2/3) of the observations show no hours worked outside 
weekdays between 7AM and 8PM.  To examine whether our results are sensitve to their inclusion, we 
re-estimated the Cobb-Douglas and translog models without them.  The results do not change 
qualitively:  The translog model clearly dominates the Cobb-Douglas; and the elasticities of factor price 
for weekday-time work are -0.20 and 0.07, for other work 0.20 and -0.27—little different from what 
are shown in the Table. 
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concept of cooperation does not make sense in this context, or possibly just because of noise 
in the data, the sizes of some of the estimated effects do not seem believable.20 
Equations (4) and (5) specify the relative demand for labor at irregular and regular 
hours as a function of control variables and proxies for v/w.  We measure the first of these, 
OH/H, as the average ratio of overtime to total hours over the years 1995-2002.  These data 
are reported in the QP only for October in those years. Using data from only one month of the 
year, and from years before May 2003, from which the data on work timing come, obviates 
any problems that might arise if this forcing variable were measured at the same time as the 
outcome. The second proxy, the share of fixed-term workers in the firm, is from the QP of 
October 2003, rather than from the EUCOWE.  Portugal and Varejão (2008) show the high 
rate of fixed-term contract hires in Portugal, especially for unskilled jobs. 
The first three columns of Table 6 present the results for the proxy OH/H, with the 
parameter estimates on the control variables presented in the Appendix.  In addition to the 
controls used before, we added the firm’s average workweek, H, to avoid any possible 
mechanical relationship between irregular work and hours that might arise because a few 
firms have unusually long workweeks. In addition to examining the timing of the relative 
demand for all workers, we disaggregate and present estimates for skilled and unskilled 
workers separately.  As with the production functions, here too the significance of the fixed 
effects suggests that there are shifts in this relative labor-demand function across two-digit 
industries.  
Remembering that the dependent variable is defined as employment at irregular hours 
relative to daytime weekday hours, the estimates of the impact of overtime relative to total 
hours, our first proxy for relative fixed employment costs, are generally positive (except for 
skilled workers in services, etc.).  For the entire sample and for manufacturing, etc., they are 
highly significant statistically.  In general, in those firms within narrowly-defined industries 
where overtime forms a larger share of total hours, more work is performed outside normal 
                                                 
20None of our data sets allows for the construction of the capital stock at the plant level, nor are any 
other data available that could be matched to our data sets.  We know (Hamermesh, 1993) that capital 
and skill are complementary, so that this absence could bias the estimated parameters.  By including as 
controls all the proxies for skill, e.g., educational attainment and age, and by estimating all the models 
including industry fixed effects, these biases are likely to be minimized. 
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hours.  This is not a mechanical relationship:  1) As we noted above, the overtime data are 
measured over a long period of time preceding the week for which working timing is 
reported; and 2) In any case, given that a worker’s weekly hours cannot exceed 50 and that 
there are 65 daytime weekday hours, we could well have observed the opposite relationship.  
That we do not suggests that the underlying behavior is consistent with our theory. 
A comparison between the estimates for skilled and unskilled workers provides 
additional support for our approach.  In all cases the semi-elasticities for the former group are 
smaller.  Under the assumption that α1 is uncorrelated with skill level, this result is consistent 
with a massive body of evidence (Hamermesh, 1993, Ch. 3) that elasticities of labor demand 
generally decrease in absolute value with skill.  The results here show that the general finding 
also applies to the temporal responsiveness of labor demand to incentives. 
The final three columns of Table 6 present estimates of (5).  Although the parameter 
estimates are not statistically significant except at a very low critical value, they all have the 
expected negative sign.  Moreover, as we would expect, given the much greater utilization of 
fixed-term contracts among unskilled than among skilled workers, λ is a much better proxy 
for the effects of the ratio of fixed to variable costs on the timing of labor demand among 
unskilled than among skilled workers. It is also worth noting that this additional proxy for v/w 
hardly changes the estimated effect of our first proxy. 
Although not the focus of this study, the relation of irregular hours to firm size 
implied by the estimates is also interesting:  Smaller firms are more likely to use labor outside 
daytime weekday hours.  Moreover, this effect is especially pronounced in services, trade and 
transport, suggesting that within narrowly defined industries in that sector smaller firms 
survive by providing service at niche times.  In manufacturing, mining and utilities, there are 
less likely to be niche times, so it is unsurprising to find a smaller and statistically 
insignificant effect of scale on the temporal distribution of labor demand. 
While the theoretical derivation says nothing about differences between behavior at 
the intensive and extensive margins, it is interesting to consider the possibility.  We thus re-
estimated (4) and (5) excluding those observations for which ln(N) = 0 or ln(D)=0. The scale 
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effect is unchanged, but the impact of OH/H is only one-third the size when we examine the 
intensive margin alone (but still highly significant statistically), while the impact of temporary 
contracts is slightly smaller.  Implicitly the impact of the penalty for irregular hours is bigger 
at the extensive than the intensive margin. 
Because of the limitations imposed by the absence of company-wide sales data, all of 
the analyses have been restricted to single-plant firms.  These firms are inherently incapable 
of taking advantage of yet another margin as the relative price of hours at different times of 
the week changes, but multi-plant firms may be able to substitute production among plants 
that differ temporally in the technology of production.  With this possibility in mind we might 
conclude that our estimates may understate the average extent to which intemporal 
substitution in labor demand is possible. 
VI. Some Policy Simulations 
 The estimates that we have developed here are the first available to allow the 
evaluation of the potential impact of policies that might shift the timing of work.  The 
applications in this Section are fairly mechanical, but they are worth illustrating given the 
potential importance of such policies and of international differences in work timing.  
Applying the estimates directly to Portugal, we can ask what would happen to the distribution 
of work-hours between daytime weekdays and irregular hours if the existing penalties on the 
latter were abolished.  The starting point is the sample average penalty rate on irregular hours 
that we observe in the data, θ = 0.44.21   
Clearly, working irregular hours is a disamenity, and one doubts that employers could 
avoid some penalty rate absent a legislative mandate.  What would θ be absent the mandate?  
A variety of estimates of this parameter have been produced for the (along this dimension) 
unregulated U.S. labor market, including by Kostiuk (1990), Shapiro (1995) and Hamermesh 
(1999a).  Estimates have ranged from 0 (or even negative) to above 0.2, but a fair reading of 
the literature suggests using θ = 0.1 is a reasonable estimate.  Taking this penalty as the 
benchmark for what an unregulated Portuguese market would generate, the change in the 
                                                 
21As Trejo (1991) shows for overtime penalties, some, in this case unknown amount of any change in 
tbe penalty would be dissipated as workers’ supply decisions adjust to changing incentives. To the 
extent that this would be important we thus overstate the impacts of the policy changes discussed here. 
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wage differential between irregular and daytime weekday hours would be 31 percent.  
Applying the cross-price elasticity that we estimated using the translog approximation 
suggests that deregulation of work timing might lead to an increase of perhaps 2 percent in the 
total number of worker-hours observed outside daytime weekday slots. 
The Portuguese labor law that became effective in 2004 changed the default starting 
boundary of night work from 8PM to 10PM.  This effectively reduced the average penalty 
rate on irregular hours by some unknown amount from the 0.44 observed in our sample.  In 
particular, 10 of the previously 55 nighttime weekday hours were converted to daytime 
weekday hours, clearly abolishing the legislated 25 percent penalty on nearly 20 percent of 
irregular weekday hours. Our results imply that this change would have caused a spreading 
out of the workday—a substitution of hours between 8PM and 10PM for hours between 7AM 
and 8PM.  
 It is clear (Burda et al, 2008) that more night and weekend work occurs in the United 
States than in other industrialized nations.  Some of the reasons may be the absence of 
government policy on this subject, the small extent of trade unionism and the absence of any 
extension of trade-union policies on work-hours beyond the unionized sector. While the 
estimates for Portugal obviously cannot be applied perfectly to evaluate policy changes in the 
U. S., one might use our estimates as a first approximation to how work-hours might be 
reallocated in the U. S. if it legislated a penalty on night/weekend work.  We are not aware of 
any explicit legislation embodying this proposal, but general calls for policies to reduce and 
reallocate hours have been made (Burda et al, 2008; Nickell, 2008). 
 Assume as above that the current penalty for work at irregular times averages 0.1 in 
the U. S. Assume also that we are evaluating a proposal to impose a 50 percent penalty on 
work outside daytime/weekdays, so that the relative price of an hour of work at irregular 
times is increased by 36 percent. Then taking the estimated cross-price elasticity from Table 
5, one calculates that the policy would result in a decrease of 2.5 percent in labor input during 
irregular hours.  Not a huge effect, but a small step toward reducing America’s standing as an 
extreme outlier in the employment of labor at unusual times. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 In this study we have provided the first examination of the facts about and 
determinants of employers’ demand for labor at different times of the day and week.  We 
must stress that the question of the timing of work is logically independent of the question of 
the amount of work—hours per time period—that employees are on the job.  While 
substantial research has been conducted on the latter, no empirical research had previously 
been offered on the former based on evidence from employers.  Our study has taken 
advantage of a new data set that, in conjunction with other data sets, has allowed us to 
illustrate hourly/daily fluctuations in the number of employees at work and to examine the 
role of pay penalties for work at irregular times of the day and week in affecting these 
fluctuations. 
 Our results suggest that employers are able to substitute work at one time of the 
day/week for work at another time—the t-subscripts on the arguments of production functions 
need to be taken seriously, as technology does allow firms to alter work timing in response to 
incentives.  Indeed, our findings indicate that employers do exactly that—variations in the 
fixed costs of employment, and in penalties for employment outside usual hours, induce shifts 
in employment across hours within the day and days within the week.  The results show that 
both legislated and collectively-bargained penalties on work at different times of the 
day/week alter work timing.  Such penalties can thus be a tool for social policy on work time, 
which may be especially important given our evidence on the demographic characteristics of 
the distribution of work at irregular times in a regulated labor market (Portugal) compared to 
its distribution in an unregulated one (the U.S.).  
 Our theory implies that a relative increase in fixed costs will, in addition to increasing 
the amount of overtime work, increase the amount of work at non-standard hours if employers 
are penalized for using them.  Our empirical results suggest this is what we observe in the 
data.  Given the secular rise in fixed costs of employment, one might be led to expect an 
increase in the amount of work performed in some economies at non-standard times. 
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 We hope that this study will help to launch investigations that take advantage of the 
recent creation of employer-based surveys of work timing in other countries that could be 
matched with other employer-employee data sets to shed light on other aspects of decisions 
about timing.  Indeed, since our discussion has recognized the role of workers’ preferences in 
affecting firms’ decisions about the timing of operating hours, one could well go further and 
hope for a data set matching firms’ opening times with their workers’ time diaries that might 
permit the development of a complete structural model of the timing of work.  Finally, it 
should be possible to combine some of these surveys with detailed information on 
collectively-bargained penalties on work timing, or with the differing application of statutory 
penalties across firms, to infer directly the impact of penalties on timing. 
 22 
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Figure 1. Tempogram of Total Employment in Portuguese Firms 
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Figure 2. Tempogram of Total Employment by Industry 
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Figure 3.  Tempogram of Work Timing from the 1999 Portuguese Household 
Time-Use Survey 
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 Figure 4.  Tempogram of the Number of Portuguese Firms in Operation 
(Maximum 964) 
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Table 1.  Provisions Regarding Irregular Hours in Selected Countries 
  Criteria for  Limits Rest Compensation Health & Transfers Rights to Prohibitions Special 
  Nightwork   periods   Safety   Equal   Categories 
              Treatment     
Austria           ✓       
Belgium ✓                 
Czech 
Republic         ✓ ✓   ✓   
Denmark         ✓ ✓       
Finland ✓ ✓               
France       ✓ ✓ ✓     ✓ 
Germany       ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
Greece ✓     ✓           
Ireland           ✓       
Italy       ✓   ✓       
Latvia           ✓       
Luxembourg   ✓   ✓           
Netherlands   ✓ ✓     ✓       
Portugal       ✓ ✓ ✓       
Romania       ✓ ✓ ✓       
Slovakia       ✓           
Spain           ✓       
UK         ✓ ✓ ✓     
Japan       ✓           
Source: ILO – Database of work and employment  
✓ indicates that the country has an entry on the ILO database for the corresponding column heading 
 
 
Table 2. Composition of the Workforce, by Timing of Work (Imputed) 
 
Characteristic: 
Night Saturday Sunday All hours 
Gender (percent male) 93.4 77.9 60.6 58.8 
Age (avg. in yrs) 36.3 37.2 38.5 37.8 
Education (percent):     
   ≤6 yrs of school 33.1 53.9 46.1 56.8 
   6-9 yrs of school 32.2 22.9 21.2 17.9 
   9-12 yrs of school 27.3 15.9 20.9 16.1 
   >12 6.8 6.5 10.8 8.9 
Skill-level (percent skilled 
workers) 
73.7 63.1 54.9 56.9 
Note: The percentages for the different schooling levels do not add up to 100 because a small number of 
observations (0.3 percent of the total) have missing information on schooling. 
Table 3.  Estimates of Production Functions with Work Timing (Dep. Var. ln(Sales)) 
 
 
All 
Industries  
Services, Trade and 
Transport 
  Manufacturing, 
Mining and Utilities 
       
 Cobb- Translog Cobb- Translog Cobb- Translog 
  Douglas   Douglas   Douglas  
       
ln(D) 1.0293 0.5490 0.9764 0.8716 1.0333 0.5080 
 (0.0252) (0.1890) (0.0556) (0.4080) (0.0270) (0.2113) 
       
ln(N) 0.0823 0.2179 0.0645 0.2915 0.0846 0.2080 
 (0.0137) (0.0601) (0.0335) (0.1368) (0.0140) (0.0652) 
       
[ln(D)]2  0.0403  0.0148  0.0427 
  (0.0139)  (0.0307)  (0.0154) 
       
[ln(N)]2   0.0377   0.0475   0.0347 
  (0.0083)  (0.0018)  (0.0089) 
       
ln(D)·ln(N)  -0.0510  -0.0704  -0.0471 
  (0.0101)  (0.0248)  (0.0102) 
Controls:       
Share age 35-
49 0.0689 0.1044 -0.2435 -0.1298 0.1561 0.1792 
 (0.1798) (0.1770) (0.3407) (0.3407) (0.2054) (0.2017) 
       
Share age 50+ -0.2231 -0.0926 -0.3769 -0.1428 -0.1292 -0.0379 
 (0.1856) (0.1844) (0.3550) (0.3591) (0.2111) (0.2082) 
       
Share ED 9-11 0.2119 0.2720 0.1948 0.2209 0.0790 0.1823 
 (0.1709) (0.1680) (0.3175) (0.3160) (0.1999) (0.1957) 
        
Share ED 12 1.0200 0.9905 0.6126 0.6207 1.3515 1.2699 
 (0.1901) (0.1867) (0.3007) (0.2974) (0.2774) (0.2719) 
       
Share ED>12 1.7978 1.8692 1.3799 1.4583 3.1239 3.2976 
 (0.2719) (0.2668) (0.3835) (0.3811) (0.5240) (0.5122) 
        
Share female -0.3014 -0.2436 -0.6939 -0.6395 -0.3205 0.0269 
 (0.1412) (0.1395) (0.2557) (0.2556) (0.1688) (0.1656) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.773 0.664 0.672 0.811 0.820 
       
N = 964 964 314 314 650 650 
df Industry 
fixed effects (40, 915) (40, 912) (17, 288)  (17, 285) (22, 619)  (22, 616) 
 p-value on F-
statistic <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.001 0.001 
p-value on 
translog terms'  <.001  0.02  <.001 
Table 4. Estimates of Sales, Wage Bill and Earnings, All Industries 
 
   Firms       Firms                    Workers  
Dependent 
Variable: 
ln(Total 
Sales) 
ln(Total 
Wage Bill) 
  
ln(Earnings) 
   
  
 
Independent 
Variable:   
 Independent 
Variable:   
ln(D) 1.0309 1.0394  ln(D) 0.0380 
 (0.0244) (0.0171)   (0.0016) 
   
 
  
ln(N) 0.0823 0.0666  ln(N) 0.0072 
 (0.0132) (0.0092)   (0.0006) 
   
  
 
Share age 35 - 49 0.1049 0.1277  Age 35-49 0.2051 
 (0.1763) (0.1235)   (0.0035) 
   
  
 
Share age 50+ -0.2375 -0.1036  Age 50+ 0.2934 
 (0.1798) (0.1260)   (0.0047) 
   
  
 
Share ED 9-11 0.1940 0.1376  ED 9-11 0.1901 
 (0.1674) (0.1173)   (0.0045) 
   
  
 
Share ED 12 1.0840 0.4263  ED 12 0.4033 
 (0.1869) (0.1310)   (0.0048) 
   
  
 
Share ED>12 1.8618 1.1188  ED >12 1.0057 
 (0.2632) (0.1844)   (0.0062) 
   
  
 
Share female -0.2640 -0.2199  Female -0.2126 
 (0.1374) (0.0962)   (0.0036) 
   
  
 
Adjusted R2 0.778 0.870   0.518 
   
 
  
N= 954 954   60573 
   
  
 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes 
  
Yes 
 Table 5.  Estimates of Elasticities of Factor Price and Demand,    
  All Industries     
  εij  ηij 
     
Hours: 
7AM-8PM  
M-F Other 
7AM-8PM  
M-F Other 
     
All Industries     
7AM-8PM M-F -0.062 0.037   -11.436 0.679 
       
Other 0.196 -0.364 3.627 -0.068 
     
     
Service, trade and transport    
7AM-8PM M-F -0.134 0.0001 -5.141 26.224 
       
Other 0.0006 -0.271 1106.148 -0.107 
     
     
Manufacturing, mining and utilities    
7AM-8PM M-F -0.054 0.043 -13.281 0.554 
       
Other 0.236 -0.397 3.022 -0.060 
     
 Table 6.  Estimates of Relative Demand Functions for Hours at Different Times (Dep. Var is ln(N/D)) 
 
    
   
All 
Industries   
     
 All Skilled Unskilled      All              Skilled           Unskilled 
 Workers Workers Workers  Workers       Workers            Workers 
     
ln(Sales) -0.1030 -0.3092 -0.4080   -0.0924         -0.2659            -0.1872 
 (0.0445) (0.0370) (0.0519)   (0.0459)       (0.0380)           (0.0521) 
     
Overtime Hours/Total 
Hours 0.2557 0.1409 0.2136    0.2556          0.1400              0.2244 
 (0.0427) (0.0341) (0.0509)   (0.0430)       (0.0339)           (0.0475) 
     
Fraction Fixed-Term      -0.4451        -0.1658             -0.4685 
      (0.3018)       (0.24501)           (0.256) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.405 0.256    0.345            0.398                 0.271 
     
N = 964 964 964      936               909                   814 
     
df Industry fixed 
effects (40, 914) (40, 914) (40, 914)   (40, 885)      (40, 858)         (40, 763) 
 p-value on F-statistic <.001 <.001 <.001     <.001            <.001               <.001 
     
   
Services, 
trade and 
transport   
     
ln(Sales) -0.1523 -0.1885 -0.2709  
 (0.0714) (0.0630) (0.0867)  
     
Overtime Hours/Total 
Hours 0.0972 -0.0064 0.1933  
 (0.0836) (0.0712) (0.0946)  
     
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.532 0.173  
     
N = 314 314 314  
     
df Industry fixed 
effects (17, 287) (17, 287) (17, 287)  
 p-value on F-statistic <.001 <.001 <.001  
Table 6, cont. 
     
   
Manufacturing, 
mining and 
utilities     
     
ln(Sales) -0.0695 -0.3784 -0.4484  
 (0.0576) (0.0467) (0.0664)  
     
Overtime Hours/Total 
Hours 0.2761 0.166 0.2279  
 (0.0505) (0.0393) (0.0610)  
     
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.230 0.218  
N = 650 650 650  
df Industry fixed 
effects (22, 618) (22, 618) (22, 618)  
 p-value on F-statistic <.001 <.001 <.001  
 
1All the estimating equations include the same control variables that were included in Table 3. 
Appendix Table 1.  Parameter Estimates for Control Variables Included in Table 6. 
 All Industries Services, trade and transport Manufacturing, mining and  
       
 utilities   
 All Skilled Unskilled All Skilled Unskilled All Skilled Unskilled 
 Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers 
Control 
Variable:          
Average  -0.0132 -0.0113 -0.0267 -0.0192 -0.0221 -0.0086 -0.0060 0.0007 -0.0472 
 weekly (0.0192) (0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0242) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0288) (0.0212) (0.0235) 
 hours          
          
Share age 
35-49 -0.2467 -0.4453 -0.1489 -0.5116 -0.8567 0.3954 -0.1410 -0.1823 -0.3386 
 (0.4331) (0.3610) (0.5000) (0.6166) (0.5466) (0.7313) (0.5831) (0.4729) (0.6720) 
           
Share age 
50+ -0.0225 -0.3272 0.3270 0.2630 -0.0506 0.4108 -0.3441 -0.4755 0.3207 
 (0.4466) (0.3736) (0.5159) (0.6396) (0.5680) (0.7644) (0.6013) (0.4884) (0.6896) 
           
Share ED 
9-11 0.0590 -0.1316 0.2588 -0.7735 -0.6511 0.6171 0.5264 0.1380 0.0629 
 (0.4142) (0.3458) (0.4770) (0.5692) (0.5040) (0.6786) (0.5708) (0.4646) (0.6542) 
          
Share ED 
12-14 -0.0731 -0.1041 1.6484 -1.0683 -1.3075 1.4018 1.2097 1.3581 2.0806 
 (0.4630) (0.3844) (0.5351) (0.5412) (0.4776) (0.6449) (0.7921) (0.6422) (0.9124) 
          
Share ED 
15+ -1.2100 -1.4778 3.202268 -1.5949 -2.4032 3.0142 -1.8267 -0.6967 3.1169 
 (0.6650) (0.5549) (0.7696) (0.6979) (0.6186) (0.8334) (1.5211) (1.2343) (1.7488) 
          
Share 
female -0.3502 0.1827 -1.8094 0.1620 0.3645 -0.9376 -0.9511 0.0778 -2.2323 
 (0.3385) (0.2824) (0.3920) (0.4655) (0.4117) (0.5566) (0.4754) (0.3862) (0.5480) 
          
 
